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Abstract
In this paper, we argue for a regulatory framework under which a bank’s required
level of equity capital depends on the equity capital of its peers. Such banking-
on-the-average rules are transparent and could also be combined with the current
regulatory framework. In addition, we argue that banking-on-the-average rules
ensure the build-up of bank equity capitals in booms and thus avoid excessive
leverage. Prudent banks can impose prudency on other banks. In a simple
model of a banking system, we show that a banking-on-the-average framework
can deliver the socially optimal solution because it induces banks to abstain from
gambling. Moreover, it alleviates socially harmful consequences of conventional
equity-capital rules, which may induce banks to excessively cut back on lending
or liquidate desirable long-term investment projects in downturns.
Keywords: banking on the average, equity-capital requirements, banking sys-
tem, banking crisis
JEL: G21, G28
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comments and suggestions.1 Introduction
Designing equity-capital requirements for banks is a thorny issue because such regu-
lations need to fulﬁll at least three objectives (see Hellwig (2008)). They should curb
excessive risk-taking by bank managers; they should guarantee that equity capital can
act as a buﬀer against negative shocks in order to avoid insolvency; and they should
allow for supervisory intervention before banks become insolvent.
The risk-sensitive capital requirements of Basel II suﬀer from a variety of shortcomings
with regard to these objectives.1 For instance, regulatory capital cannot be used as a
buﬀer against adverse shocks because otherwise the bank would violate the regulation.
Moreover, the regulatory framework did not prevent the build-up of leverage by many
banks starting in the early 1990s, which made the banking system vulnerable to ad-
verse shocks. Probably the most dramatic drawback is that it reinforces a downward
spiral when a boom turns into bust. The reason is that when credit risks increase, an
individual bank is encouraged or forced to recoil from risk by shedding risky exposures
as quickly as possible. Cutting lending to other banks or industrial ﬁrms, however,
makes the banking system more unstable, and the ensuing credit crunch reinforces the
economic downturn.2
In short, during a downturn Basel II tries to ensure the soundness of individual insti-
tutions, thereby destabilizing the entire system (see Brunnermeier et al. (2009)). One
of the key issues for capital regulation is thus how banks should adjust their balance
sheets when losses reduce equity capital.
Recently, Gersbach (2009) proposed a set of rules for capital requirements on a banking-
on-the-average principle. In particular, capital requirements for an individual bank
should depend on average equity capital in the banking industry, i.e. on the current
level of aggregate bank equity in relation to aggregate assets. One of the central ideas
1Blum (2008) shows that regulatory capital requirements that are dependent on self-reported risk
should be augmented by an additional, risk-independent leverage-ratio restriction.
2There is extensive literature on the potential procyclicality of bank-capital requirements and their
macroeconomic implications (see Blum and Hellwig (1995), Gordy and Howells (2006), and Hellwig
(2008)).
2is that a bank is required to have high equity when its peers also have high equity.
Capital requirements are lower if an adverse aggregate shock has eaten into the equity
of a bank’s competitors.
In this paper we present a simple model for a banking-on-the-average capital require-
ment and explore the properties of, and the rationale for, those rules. We show that
such a rule can serve two purposes. First, it can prevent banks from taking excessive
risks. Second, it can avoid a downward spiral with high social costs if a detrimental
systemic shock has occurred. By contrast, a conventional rule where the required level
of equity capital a bank must hold is independent of the equity of its peers is always
socially inferior. It either induces banks to gamble or forces them to liquidate valuable
long-term investments in the event of a harmful systemic shock.
We also discuss several additional advantages of banking-on-the-average capital re-
quirements. Such rules allow the build-up of bank equity capital in booms, thereby
creating buﬀers for bad times and avoiding excessive leverage. Moreover, such rules
are simple and transparent and could easily be integrated into the existing regulatory
framework.
The paper is organized as follows: In the next section we explain the concept of a
banking-on-the-average capital requirement. A simple model of a banking system is
described in Section 3. In Section 4 we show that a capital requirement based on
banking-on-the-average is favorable from a welfare point of view. In Section 5 we ad-
dress some issues to be considered when banking-on-the-average rules are implemented.
Section 6 concludes.
2 The Banking-on-the-Average Rule
In this section we outline the regulatory framework of banking on the average (hence-
forth BoA). In general, a BoA capital requirement speciﬁes that a bank’s required level
of equity as a fraction of investments is a monotonically increasing function of the
average equity-to-investments ratio of other banks. Using ei to denote bank i’s equity
3capital in relation to its investments and e−i to denote the average ratio of equity to
investments of the other banks, the equity ratio ei,req required for bank i can be written
as
ei,req = f(e−i), (1)
where f(·) is a weakly monotonically increasing function. A possible BoA function is
f(e−i) =
 
e−i + κ(e∗ − e−i) for e−i < e∗ − D
e∗ for e−i ≥ e∗ − D,
(2)
where e∗, D, and κ are parameters with e∗ > 0, D ≥ 0, and 0 ≤ κ < 1. Intuitively,
if the average level of equity among a bank’s competitors, e−i, is close to or higher
than the level e∗, which is the level desirable for times when no adverse shock hits
the economy, the required equity ratio will be e∗. If, however, an adverse shock hits
the economy and drives down equity ratios for all banks, capital requirements will be
relaxed. In particular, each individual bank is required to have an equity ratio that
exceeds the average equity ratio of its competitors by κ(e∗ − e−i) in this case.
This term serves two purposes. First, it ensures that equity-capital levels recover grad-
ually after a detrimental systemic shock has reduced the equity of all banks. Second, it
prevents the build-up of excessive leverage in the entire banking system during booms.
Without this term, a downward spiral could result. Banks may decrease their equity
capital, which would result in lower capital requirements and thus enable them to re-
duce their equity capital further. For positive values of κ, banks will be forced to raise
their equity after a short period of time if they jointly engage in leverage build-up.
Since increasing equity will be costly for banks, they will refrain from such a strategy
in the ﬁrst place if κ is suﬃciently large.
A more sophisticated BoA rule could also allow for higher capital requirements if the
average equity-to-investments ratio in the banking system exceeds e∗. For example, if
many banks increase equity levels due to a particularly uncertain economic outlook, it
may be desirable to force other banks to increase their equity levels as well. Accordingly,





e−i + κ(e∗ − e−i) for e−i < e∗ − D
e∗ for e∗ − D ≤ e−i < e∗
e∗ + γ(e−i − e∗) for e−i ≥ e∗,
(3)
where γ (1 > γ > 0) would be a parameter determining how strongly a bank would have
to adjust its equity capital upwards if other banks had increased their equity capital.
Such rules allow prudent banks to induce other banks to also behave prudently.
BoA rules have the potential to improve on standard capital requirement rules. Like
standard rules, they may reduce banks’ incentives to choose excessively risky invest-
ment strategies in good times. At the same time they ensure that banks do not have
to liquidate valuable long-term investments or cut back on lending when an adverse
shock hits the economy. Hence, equity capital can work as a buﬀer to cushion harmful
systemic shocks. This is shown in the next section.
3 Model
We consider a banking industry with an exogenously given number of banks n. There
are two periods. At the beginning of the ﬁrst period, banks are identical, each of them
being endowed with an amount of equity E(1). In a competitive market for deposits,
banks ﬁnance themselves at the prevailing interest rate rd. As banks are identical,
each bank receives the same amount of deposits, which is denoted by S.3 Banks use
deposits and equity to ﬁnance long-term investments I (I = E(1) + S).
Banks can choose between two types of investment, prudent investments and risky ones.
We assume that each individual bank invests all its resources either in the prudent or
in the risky technology. This assumption simpliﬁes the exposition but does not aﬀect
our ﬁndings.
Prudent investments are only subject to a systemic shock η. This systemic shock has
two possible realizations, η = 0 and η = −B (B > 0). First, “good times” may
3For example, this may justiﬁed by a large number of depositors, each of them placing savings at
all banks with equal probability.
5occur with probability pg. Then the realization is η = 0 and the net rate of return on
investments for bank i is ri = r + η = r with r > 0. Second, “bad times” (η = −B)
occur with probability pb = 1 − pg. In this case, the net rate of return on investments
is ri = r + η = r − B.
Risky investments yield lower expected returns and are subject to idiosyncratic shocks
in addition to the systemic shock. Speciﬁcally if bank i undertakes risky investments,
the idiosyncratic shock si will take the values −S and +S with equal probability. The
rate of return is assumed to be ri = r + η + si − ∆, where ∆ (∆ > 0) measures the
diﬀerence in expected returns between prudent and risky investments. Despite lower
expected returns on risky investments, banks may ﬁnd it attractive to choose these
projects due to limited liability, as will be shown later.
Equity in the second period is E
(2)
i = Iri−S(1+rd). It is now convenient to introduce
variables for the diﬀerent realizations of the equity-to-investment ratio E(2)/I in the
second period
e
gg := (1 + r + S − ∆) − (1 + rd)S/I, (4)
e
gb := (1 + r − S − ∆) − (1 + rd)S/I, (5)
e
g0 := (1 + r) − (1 + rd)S/I, (6)
e
bg := (1 + r − B + S − ∆) − (1 + rd)S/I, (7)
e
bb := (1 + r − B − S − ∆) − (1 + rd)S/I, (8)
e
b0 := (1 + r − B) − (1 + rd)S/I. (9)
The ﬁrst superscript stands for the realization of the systemic shock (b or g); the second
superscript describes whether a negative idiosyncratic shock (b) or a favorable one (g)
has occurred. A superscript of 0 means that the respective bank has engaged in the
prudent investment technology, for which no idiosyncratic shock is present.
We make the following assumptions on the parameters of our model: First, egy > 0
∀y ∈ {b,g,0}, eby > 0 ∀y ∈ {g,0}, and ebb < 0. Intuitively, a bank will only become
insolvent if there is a negative aggregate shock, the bank chooses the risky technology,
and a detrimental idiosyncratic shock occurs. Second, we assume −1
2pbebb > ∆. We will
6show later that this assumption guarantees that the risky technology would be chosen
by banks in the absence of capital requirements. Intuitively, ∆ gives the costs for
choosing the risky technology rather than the prudent technology. −1
2pbebb is associated
with the gains from gambling. Due to limited liability, a bank does not incur all of the
losses if there are bad realizations of both the idiosyncratic and the systemic shock.
Third, we assume egb > eb0. Roughly speaking, this assumption ensures that the
eﬀects of the aggregate shock on bank equity are suﬃciently strong compared to the
potentially negative impact of gambling.
In the following, we work with a suﬃciently large number of banks, which enables a
tractable formal analysis due to the law of large numbers. Under this assumption, the
idiosyncratic shocks average out when computing the economy-wide ratio of equity to
investment. Using λ to denote the fraction of banks choosing risky investment projects,
the aggregate ratio of equity to investment, e, takes only two possible values, one for
a bad and one for a good realization of the systemic shock
e
G = e
g0 − λ∆, (10)
e
B = e
b0 − λ∆. (11)
The regulator imposes a minimum capital requirement on banks. For simplicity, we
assume that the initial equity level is suﬃciently high, so the requirement is non-binding
in the ﬁrst period. In the second period, bank i’s minimum equity level as a fraction
of I is given by a function ereq = f(e).4 A speciﬁc form for this function will be given
later.
A bank that violates the capital requirement has to adjust its balance sheet either by
raising new equity or by reducing assets I. If the bank decides to raise new equity,
the value of old equity will dilute, implying costs for old shareholders.5 If the bank
reduces I, costs may arise because the bank may be forced to sell assets at a price below
4Due to the large number of banks we do not have to distinguish between the average equity ratio
e for all banks and the average ratio among all banks expect for bank i.
5Such costs are well documented. The classical literature includes Scholes (1972), Asquith and
Mullins (1986), and Mikkelson and Partch (1986).
7their fundamental value.6 Moreover, the bank may be forced to liquidate long-term
investments, which is also costly.7 We will not model this stage of the game explicitly
but simply assume that the adjustment costs are proportional to equity.8 In addition,
we assume that the costs are higher in “bad times”, where it may be diﬃcult to issue
new equity or to sell assets at a fair price.
Accordingly, we assume that balance-sheet adjustment costs as a fraction of investments
are given by Cg := αgei in good times (1 > αg > 0). These costs accrue to the
individual bank but do not represent welfare losses. For example, if a bank is forced to
sell assets below their fundamental value, then the bank’s shareholders will lose, but
the investors purchasing these assets will beneﬁt at the same time. In a similar vein,
issuing new shares may dilute the value of old shares. However, new shareholders or
debt-holders will gain in proportion. Both eﬀects on aggregate welfare balance each
other.
In bad times, balance-sheet adjustment costs are higher; they are given by Cb := αbei
with 1 > αb > αg. We assume that these costs are not only incurred by shareholders
of the respective bank; they also represent social losses because in bad times issuing
new equity or selling assets may be very diﬃcult or even impossible. Banks will have
to liquidate proﬁtable long-term investment projects instead, which is also costly from
a perspective of aggregate welfare.
Finally, we assume that deposits are guaranteed implicitly or explicitly by the govern-
ment. The current crisis has highlighted the fact that governments will ultimately step
in and protect depositors from bank defaults. Hence, we assume that the insolvency of
a bank (ei < 0) creates social costs k |ei|I. These costs arise because the government
has to bail out the bank, which means that distortionary taxes have to be raised at
some point in time.
6See Brunnermeier et al. (2009) and Hellwig (2008) for explanations why asset values may fall
below their fundamental value in a crisis.
7This is a standard scenario in the bank-run framework that goes back to Diamond and Dybvig
(1983).
8This assumption simpliﬁes the analysis but it is immaterial to our ﬁndings.
8The sequence of events is given as follows:
• 1st Period
– Each bank is endowed with a ﬁxed level of equity E(1) and obtains deposits
S at a competitive rate rd.
– It uses these resources to ﬁnance either prudent or risky investments I =
E(1) + S.
• 2nd Period
– Nature draws shocks si and η.
– Each bank i observes its new equity ratio ei.
– Banks with ei < 0 become insolvent and create social costs k |ei|I.
– If the equity ratio ei of a solvent bank i falls short of the minimum capital
requirement ereq, the bank has to adjust its balance sheet at costs αgei or
αbei respectively.
– Returns on investment accrue, and depositors have to be paid back.
4 Analysis
4.1 Welfare
As a ﬁrst step, we focus on the social optimum in our model. Our welfare measure is
total output at the end of the second period. Suppose a social planner could choose the
banks’ investment strategies in order to maximize the welfare expected at the beginning
of period 1. We immediately obtain
Proposition 1
A social planner would choose prudent investments for all banks. Moreover, he would








9As risky investments yield lower expected returns, it is clear that the social planner will
not pursue them. Moreover, the social planner avoids liquidating long-term investments
because this would create costs Cb per bank. We note that total investments are given
by nI and the expected rate of return on prudent investments is 1 + r − pbB. The
latter expression can be explained by the observations that good times, which occur
with probability 1 − pb, involve a rate of return of 1 + r, while bad times, which arise
with probability pb, entail a rate of return of 1 + r − B.
4.2 Equilibrium without capital requirements
As a benchmark case, we study our model without capital requirements, i.e. ereq =
0. In the absence of capital requirements, banks have an incentive to choose risky
investment projects because due to limited liability they are able to roll oﬀ some of the
losses incurred for bad realizations of the systemic shock and the idiosyncratic shock
to the taxpayers.
Banks maximize their expected value of equity, which is equivalent to maximizing the
ratio of equity to investments because the total size of investments is ﬁxed. Hence,


















This inequality can be easily explained. We note that the left-hand side gives the
expected value of the equity-to-investments ratio for the risky technology, where we
have utilized ebb < 0, which implies that the bank becomes insolvent for a detrimental
aggregate shock and a risky investment with a negative shock realization. The right-




egg + egb 
−eg0 = −∆ and 1
2ebg−eb0 = −1
2ebb−∆, the above inequality
is equivalent to −
1
2pbebb > ∆, which holds by assumption.
We immediately obtain
Proposition 2
Without capital requirements, all banks choose risky investment projects. Expected
10welfare amounts to






Compared to the social optimum, welfare is diminished by two factors. First, banks
undertaking the risky project have expected returns that are reduced by ∆. Second, if
the economy is in the bad state, which happens with probability pb, half of the banks
will become insolvent, which will cause costs k|ebb|I per bank.
4.3 Standard capital requirement rule
In this section, we consider the standard case with a capital requirement for individual
banks that is independent of the aggregate level of equity. To put it diﬀerently, all




A rule with a standard equity-capital requirement never ensures the socially optimal
level of welfare.
Proof
If ereq ≤ eb0, the requirement is ineﬀective. First, in the good state it would never bind,
as egb > eb0. In the bad state, the realized value of ei would either be above ereq or,
in the case of a risky technology with a bad realization of the shock, the bank would
be insolvent. To sum up, for ereq ≤ eb0 social welfare is identical to the case without
capital requirements.
For ereq > eb0, social welfare can never attain its maximum value WOpt. First, if some
banks chose risky projects, welfare would be lower due to the lower expected returns
on risky projects. Second, if all banks chose prudent investment strategies, they would
have to adjust their balance sheets, resulting in social losses βeb0I per bank.
2
114.4 Banking-on-the-average rule
Finally, we examine a banking-on-the-average rule. We assume a special case of the
rule deﬁned in (2). In particular, our model comprises only two periods and thus we do
not address how equity levels should recover after a detrimental shock has occurred.9
Using e to denote the average equity ratio in the economy, we specify the following
simpliﬁed BoA rule:
ereq = f(e) =
 
eg0 for e ≥ eg0 − ∆
eb0 for e < eg0 − ∆
(15)
With this rule we obtain
Proposition 4
Suppose that the costs of violating the capital requirement are suﬃciently high such
that −1
2pbebb < ∆+αegb. If the regulator applies (15), a unique equilibrium exists. All
banks behave prudently, and no bank will ever incur costs from adjusting its balance
sheet. Consequently, the maximum level of welfare is attained.
Proof
As a ﬁrst step, we examine e for the two possible realizations of the aggregate shock.
Recall from (10) that eG = eg0 − λ∆. As λ represents the fraction of banks behaving
imprudently, which lies in the interval [0;1], e ≥ eg0 −∆ holds in the good state. Thus
each bank has to achieve an equity ratio of eg0 in the good state, irrespective of the
behavior of the other banks.
Next we examine e for the bad state. According to (11), the aggregate equity ratio





g0 − ∆ − S < e
g0 − ∆,
where we have applied our assumption egb > eb0. Thus e is always lower than eg0 − ∆
for the bad realization of the systemic shock, which implies that the required equity
ratio is always eb0 in the bad state.
9Such an analysis necessitates a dynamic model with many periods and is left for future research.

























bb < ∆ + αe
gb.
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If the condition in the proposition does not hold, the costs of violating the capital
requirement will be too low to deter banks from choosing the risky strategy. If it
holds, the banking-on-average rule described in (15) will guarantee the socially optimal
solution.
5 Discussion
The current regulatory framework stands accused of being largely powerless during the
build-up of leverage in the boom and when the boom has turned into a devastating
bust. The present paper oﬀers a proposal that could mitigate some of the deﬁciencies of
the current regulatory system. However, like any other approach to banking regulation
it is no panacea, as systemic risks have no perfect remedy. In the following, we discuss
some of the most important issues to be considered when BoA rules are implemented.
Rules versus discretion
Although we have framed the BoA principles in a set of rules, it may be useful in prac-
tice to allow for some degree of discretion, as mechanical formulas may have detrimental
aggregate eﬀects in some contingencies. For this purpose, it may be advantageous to
start with some values of the required level of bank equity in normal times, e∗, and
the adjustment parameter κ (see Equation (2)). The regulatory authority could be
allowed to increase parameter κ, thereby raising the speed of adjustment to higher
levels of bank equity after a crisis or in a phase in which banks have built up lever-
13age.10 Hence, it may be desirable to complement BoA rules with a degree of regulatory
discretion. However, discretion on behalf of the regulator entails the risk of regulatory
capture. The regulatory agency may be unwilling to use its discretion and ask for
higher levels of equity because bankers will argue that this will unduly restrict their
ability to ﬁnance mortgages or loans to ﬁrms.11 If this problem is severe, the non-
discretionary part of the framework will have to be chosen to guarantee suﬃciently
high levels of bank equity.
Additional macroeconomic indicators
The Geneva Report on the World Economy (Brunnermeier et al. (2009)) has pro-
posed that the existing Basel II capital requirements be modiﬁed by the inclusion of a
systemic-impact coeﬃcient. This coeﬃcient would depend on indicators such as trends
in leverage, asset growth, and the maturity mismatch between assets and liabilities.
Moreover, with the help of macroeconomic indicators capital requirements should be
countercyclical in order to guarantee the functioning of equity capital as a buﬀer to
absorb adverse systemic shocks.
BoA rules rely on only one indicator, namely the average capital of a bank’s peers.
However, macroeconomic indicators may be useful in varying the discretionary part of
the recapitalization adjustment and to prevent banks from jointly pursuing a strategy
of building up leverage. Suppose, for example, that all banks tend to increase leverage
so that individual and average equity-to-total-assets ratios decline. This development
would already be counteracted by the BoA rule, which would imply recapitalization in
this case. However, the regulatory authority could further increase the speed of bank-
equity recovery in order to make the strategy of increasing leverage even more costly
to banks. As a consequence, banks would refrain from engaging in such activities in
the ﬁrst place.
10Analogously, the regulator could be allowed to increase parameter γ for the more sophisticated
speciﬁcation (3).
11Brunnermeier et al. (2009) also put forward the argument that “taking away the punch bowl”
may be diﬃcult in a boom.
14Simplicity and ease of implementation
A particular advantage of BoA rules is their simplicity, because only individual and
aggregate bank equity matter in conjunction with the parameters of the rule. This
allows for ease of reporting and communication with the public. It is conceivable that
such reporting in itself will have a disciplinary eﬀect on banks, as a bank may suﬀer a
loss in reputation if its equity capital is lower compared to its peers.
Additionally, BoA rules are very ﬂexible and could also be integrated into the current
Basel II framework. One could compute values of risk-adjusted assets utilizing the
sophisticated risk weights introduced under Basel II. Then it would be straightforward
to implement BoA rules for correspondingly risk-adjusted equity-to-assets ratios. In
this way, it would be possible to reconcile the microprudential12 perspective implicit in
Basel II and the macroprudential perspective inherent in BoA rules.
6 Conclusions
In this paper we have proposed a new regulatory framework where the equity capital
that a bank is required to hold depends on the equity capital of its peers. Such a rule
may alleviate one of the main problems of current risk-sensitive capital requirements,
which force banks to maintain high equity capital ratios in a downturn, thus inducing
them to cut back on lending, which may invigorate a downward spiral.
In our simple model of a banking system, we show that conventional capital require-
ments cannot simultaneously achieve the goals of preventing excessive risk-taking by
banks and costly liquidation of long-term investment projects in a crisis. However, a
framework based on the principle of banking on the average can achieve both targets
at the same time, thereby leading to a socially optimal level of welfare.
12Borio (2003) argues that the macroprudential orientation of the current regulatory framework
should be strengthened. Brunnermeier et al. (2009) note that Basel II takes a purely microprudential
perspective, i.e. it attempts to ensure the soundness of the system by guaranteeing the soundness of
individual institutions.
15Moreover, BoA rules may prevent the build-up of leverage in booms. It is also possible
to integrate them into the current Basel II framework. Incorporating BoA principles
could be a fruitful approach to integrating the missing macroprudential elements into
the Basel II framework.
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